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PEOPLE tI. CAHAN

[Crim. No. 5670.

In Bank.

[44 C.2d

Apr. 2f, 1955.]

"iHE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CHARLES H. CAHAN,
Appellant.

:)

[1] Searches and Seizures - Use of Dictographs. - Pen. Code,
§ 653h, uuthorizing use and installation of dictographs by
peace officers in certain cases, does not and cannot authorize
violations of constitutional provisions relating to search and
seizure.
[2] Id.-Applicability of Federal Oonstitutional Provisions.-AIthough U. S. Const., 4th Amendment, relating to unreasonable
searches and seizures, applies only to federal government,
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by police.
which is at core of such amendment, is basic to a free society,
is implicit in concept of ordered liberty, and as such is enforceable against states through due process clause of 14th
Amendment.
[3] Id.-Guarantee of Privacy.-Iwportant as efficient law enforcement may be, it is more important that right of privacy
guaranfeed by U. S. Const., 4tb Amendment, relating to unreasonable searches and seizures, and Cal. Const., art. I, § 19,
guaranteeing personal privacy, be respected.
.1[4] Id.-Justification for.-Since in no case shall right of people
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures be
violated, contention that unreasonable searches and seizures
are justified by necessity of bringing criminals to justice cannot be accepted, and guilty and innocent alike should be
secure from unreasonable police intrusions.
[6] Id.-Justification for.-Provisions of U. S. Const., 4th Amendment, relating to unreasonable searches and seizures, and Cal.
Const., art. I, § 19, guaranteeing personal privacy, make no
distinction between guilty and innocent, and it would be impossible to protect rights of innocent if police were permitted
to justify unreasonable searches and seizures on ground that
they assumed their victims were criminals.
[6] Oriminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful
Seizure.-Fcderal rule that guarantee of U. S. Const., 4th
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
[6] Admissibility of evidence obtained by' illegal search and
seizure, notes, 24 A.L.R. 1408; 32 A.L.R. 408; 41 A.L.R. 1145:
52 A.L.R. 477; 88 A.L.R. 348; 150 A.L.R. 566. See also Oa1.Jur.2d.
Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Searches and Seizures, i 1; [6-9]
Criminal Law, § 410.
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Amendment, relating to unreasonable searches and seizures,
applies to states' through 14th Amendment does not require
states that have heretofore admitted illegally seized evidence
to exclude it now; such exclusionary rule is not essential ingredient of right of privacy guaranteed by 4th Amendment,
but simply means of enforcing that right, which states can
accept or reject.
['1] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained hy Unlawful Seizure.- V
Evidencp obtained in violation ()'
. ,( i tu tional guarantees
against unreasonable searches alit: ' ...cclres is inadmissible.
(Overruling People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517];
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435,24 A.L.R. 1383], and
cases based thereon.)
[8] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-A
system that permits prosecution to trust habitually to use of
illegally obtained evidence cannot help but encourage violations of Constitution at expense of lawful means of enforcing
law.
[9] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-In ../"
developing rule of evidence applicable in state courts, such
as federal rule excluding evidence obtained by unlawful search
and seizure, Supreme Court is not bound by decisions that have
applied federal rule but may reject them if they have developed needless refinements and distinctions or if federal
cases indicate needless limitations on right to conduct reasonable searches and seizures or to secure warrants.
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Werlhof, District Attorney (Tehama), as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J .-Defendant and 15 other persons were
'charged with conspiring to engage in horse-race bookmaking
and related offenses in violation of section 337a of the Penal
Code. Six of the defendants pleaded guilty. After a trial
without a jury, the court found one defendant not guilty
and each of the other defendants guilty as charged. Charles
H. Cahan, one of the defendants found guilty, was granted
probation for a period of five years on the condition that he
spend the first 90 days of his probationary period in the
county jail and pay a $2,000 fine. He appeals from the
order granting him probation and the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Most of the incriminatory evidence introduced at the trial
was obtained by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department in flagrant violation of the United States Constitution
(4th and 14th Amendments), the California Constitution
(art. I, § 19), and state and federal statutes. (Pen. Code,
§§ 146, 602; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 242; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.)
Gerald Wooters, an officer attached to the intelligence unit
of that department testified that after securing the permission
of the chief of police to make microphone installations· at
two places occupied by defendants, he, Sergeant Keeler, and
Officer Phillips one night at about 8 :45 entered one "house
through the side window of the first floor," and that he
"directed the officers to place a listening device under a chest
of drawers." Another officer made recordings and transcriptions of the conversations that came over wires from the
listening device to receiving equipment installed in a nearby
garage. About a month later, at Officer Wooters' direction,
"Section 653h of the Penal Code provides: ' 'An~ person wilo, without consent of the owner, lessee, or occupant, installs or attempts to install or use a dictogra.ph in any house, room, apartment, tenement, office,
shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, or other building, tent, vessel,
railroad car, vehicle, mine or any underground portion thereof, is guilty
of a misdemeanor; provided, that nothing herein shall prevent the use
and installation of dictographs by a regular salaried police officer expressly authorized thereto by the head of his office or department or by a
district attorney when Buch use and installation are necessary in the performance of their duties in detecting crime and ill the appreheDBion of
erilniPlle "
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a similar device was surreptitiously installed in another house
and receiving equipment was also set up in a nearby garage.
Such methods of getting evidence have been caustically censured by the United States Supreme Court: "That officers
of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a device,
even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversations of the occupants for over a month would be almost incredible if it
were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our
attention that more flagrantly, deliberately and persistently
violate the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth
Amendment. . . . " (Irvine v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128, 132
[74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561].) [1] Section 653h of the Penal
Code does not and could not authorize violations of the Constitution, and the proviso under which the officers purported
to act at most prevents their conduct from constituting a
violation of that section itself.
The evidence obtained from the microphones was not the
only unconstitutionally obtained evidence introdUCed at the
trial over defendants' objection. In addition there was a
mass of evidence obtained by numerous forcible entries and
seizures without search warrants.
The forcible entries and seizures were candidly admitted
by the various officers. For example, Officer Fosnocht identified the evidence that he seized, and testified as to his means
of entry: " .•. and how did you gain entrance to the particular place' I forced entry through the front door and
. Officer Farquarson through the rear door. You say you
forced the front door T • • • Yes. And how T I kicked it open
with my foot. • . ." Officer Schlocker testified that he entered
the place where he seized evidence "through a window located I believe it was west of the front door . . . . [W]hen
you tried to force entry in other words, you tried to knock
it [the door ] down is that right ? We tried to knock it
down, yes, sir. What with T A shoe, foot. Kick it T Tried
to kick it in, yes. And then you moved over and broke the
window to gain entrance, is that right Y We did." Officer
Scherrer testified that he gained entry into one of the places
where he seized evidence by kicking the front door in. He
also entered another place, accompanied by Officers Hilton
and Horral, by breaking through a window. Officer Harris
"just walked up and kicl{ed the door in" to gain entry to
the place assigned to him.
Thus, without fear of criminal punishment or other
discipline, law enforcement officers, sworn to support the
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Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
California, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts in
violation of both Constitutions and the laws enacted thereunder. It is clearly apparent from their testimony that
they casually regard such acts as nothing more than the
performance of their ordinary duties for which the city
empt'oys and pays them.
[2] The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Although this amendment, like each of the other provisions
of the original Bill of Rights, applies only to the federal
government (Barron v. Balt-imore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 243 [8 L.Ed.
672] ; Adamson v. Oal';,fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 51 [67 S.Ct. 1672,
91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223]), '[t]he security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is
at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' [Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 (58
S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288)] and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth
Amendment.]" (Wolf v. Oolorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 [69
S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782].) An essentially identical guarantee of personal privacy is set forth in article I, section 19
of the California Constitution.
[3] Thus both the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution make it emphatically clear that important as efficient law enforcement may be, it is more
important that the right of privacy guaranteed by these
constitutional provisions be respected. [4] Since in no case
shall the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures be violated, the contention that unreasonable searches and seizures are justified by the necessity
of bringing criminals to justice cannot be accepted. It was
rejected when the constitutional provisions were adopted
and the choice was made that all the people, guilty and
innocent alike, should be secure from unreasonable police
intrusions, even though some criminals should escape..,' Of course, this like each of our constitutional guarantees often ma7
afford a shelter for criminals. But the forefathers thought this waa DOl
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[5] Moreover, the constitutional provisions make no distinction between the guilty and the innocent, and it would be
manifestly impossible to protect the rights of the innocent
if the police were permitted to justify unreasonable searches
and seizures on the ground that they assumed their victims
were criminals. Thus, when consideration is directed to the
question of the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation
of the constitutional provisions, it bears emphasis that the
court is not concerned solely with the rights of the defendant
before it, however guilty he may appear, but with the constitutional right of all of the people to be secure in their
homes, persons, and effects.
The constitutional provisions themselves do not expressly
answer the question whether eVidence obtained in violation
thereof is admissible in criminal actions. Neither Congress
nor the Legislature has given an answer, and the courts of
the country are divided on the question. The federal courts
and those of some of the states· exclude such evidence.
(Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 [34 8.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed.
652, L.R.A. 1915B 834]; McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 [69 8.0t. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] ; see state cases collected
in Appendix to Wolf v. Oolomdo, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39.)
In accord with the traditional common-law rule (see McCormick on Evidence, p, 296), the courts of a maj9rity of
the states admit it (see cases collected in Appendix to W oll
v. Oolorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39), and heretofore the
.courts of this state have admitted it. (People v. Le Doux,
155 Oal. 535, 547 [102 P. 517] ; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal.
237, 242-253 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383] ; People v. Gonzales,
20 Oa1.2d 165, 169 [124 P.2d 44] ; People v. ](elley, 22 Ca1.2d
169, 172 [137 P.2d 1].)
[6] The decision of the United States Supreme Oourt in
Wolf v. Oolorado that the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment
too great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers, and
effects which is indispensable to the individual dignity and self·respect.
They may have overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their
command at naught." (Jackson, J., dissenting in Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 197, 198 [67 S.Ot. 1098, 91 L.Ed 13991; see also United
State8 v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 f68 S.Ot. 222, 92 L.Ed 210].)
-Legislation has recently been enacted in Texas (Acts 1953, 53d Leg.,
p. 669, eh. 253, § I: Code Crim. Proc. 727a), North 0arolina (Stats.
]951, ch. 644, § 1: Gen. Stats. §§ 15·27) and Maryland (Stats. 1947,
ch. 752, p. 1849: Stats. 1951, chs. 145, 704, 710; Rtnts. 1952. ch. 59;
Md. Ann. Code, §§ 5, 5A (limited to miBdemeanGl cases», prohibiting
the use of illegall¥ obtained evidence.
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applies to the states through the Fourteenth does not require
states like California that have heretofore admitted illegally
seized evidence to exclude it now. The exclusionary rule is
not" an essential ingredient" of the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, but simply a means of
enforcing that right, which the states can accept or reject:
"Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may
be am effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is
not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal
standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which if consistently enforced
would be equally effective." (Italics added. Wolf v. Oolorado,
supra, 338 U.S. 25 at p. 31.) The court did not state that the
other methods of deterring unreasonable searches and seizures
must be "consistently enforced" and be "equally effective."
Except in extreme cases (see Rochin v. Oalifornia, 342 U.S.
165 [72 8.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]), it is
apparently willing to leave the matter of deterring unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers entirely to the
states and is not yet ready to condemn methods other than
the exclusion of the evidence as falling below "minimal
standards" even though the state makes no effort whatever
to enforce them and in practical effect, therefore, has no
method of making this basic constitutional guarantee effective. It would appear, therefore, that despite earlier statements of the United States Supreme Court that the Fourth
or the Fifth Amendment barred the use of evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure (Go1tled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 311-313 [41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647]; Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-316 [41 8. Ct. 266, 65
L.Ed. 654] ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392
[34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652]), "the federal exclusionary
rule," in the words of Mr. Justice Black, "is not a command
of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate." (Concurring opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, at 39-40; see also
Irvine v. Californw, 347 U.S. 128, 135 [74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed.
561].) It would seem that it is also a rule that Congress
could make binding on the states to deter state invasions of
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee, which is now recognized
as limiting state as well as federal action. (Cf., Civil Rights
Act, Rev. Stats. § 1979, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 241, 242; Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 [71 8.Ct.
576, 95 L.Ed. 774]; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
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[65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495] ; see also Stefanelli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117, 120-121 [72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138].)
The rule of the Wolf case that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure was reaffirmed recently
in Irvine v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128 [74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed.
561]. The decision, as in the Wolf case, was by a divided
court. Justice Douglas dissented as he did in the Wolf case,
and Justice Clark declared: "Had I been here in 1949 when
Wolf was decided I would have applied the doctrine of
Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U.S. 383 [34 S.Ct. 341,
58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834], to the states. But the court
refused to do so then, and it still refuses today. Thus Wolf
remains the law and, as such, is entitled to the respect of
this Court's membership ..•• Perhaps strict adherence to
the tenor of that decision may produce needed converts for
its extinction." Justices Frankfurter and Burton, who were
among the majority in the Wolf case, would hold that the
methods employed in the Irvine case are so repulsive that
evidence so obtained must be excluded as a matter of due
process of law. Not only was the court closely divided, but
Justice Jackson felt it appropriate to declare for the majority:
"Now that the Wolf doctrine [the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth] is known to them,
state courts may wish further to reconsider their evidentiary
~ules. But to upset state convictions even before the states
have had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the [ exclusionary] rule would be an unwarranted nse of federal
power." (347 U.S. at p. 134.) Thus, after states that rely
on methods other than the exclusionary rule to deter unreasonable searches and seizures have had an opportunity to
reconsider their rules in the light of the Wolf doctrine, the
way is left open for the United States Supreme Court to
conclude that if these other methods are not CCconsistently
enforced" and are therefore not "equally effective" (see
Wolf v. Oolorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 31), the "minimal
standards" of due process have not been met.·
*The Wolf and Irvine cases would then be brought into line with the
eases holding coerced confessions inadmissible. (Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 [74 S.Ct. 716, 9S L.Ed. 948]; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
[69 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 93 L.Ed. 1801]; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
601 [68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224): Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
[65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029]; A.shcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
[64 S.Ot. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192].) It is now settled that Buell confusions
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Meanwhile, pursuant to the suggestion of the United States
Supreme Court, we have reconsidered the rule we have heretofore followed that the unconstitutional methods by which
evidence is obtained does not affect its admissibility and
have carefully weighed the various arguments that have been
advanced for and against that rule. It bears emphasis that
in the absence of a holding by the United States Supreme
Court that the due process clause requires exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, whatever rule we adopt,
whether it excludes or admits the evidence, will be a judicially
declared rule of evidence. (See MacNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 341 [63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819]; On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 756 [72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270].)
The rule admitting the evidence has been strongly supported by both scholars and judges.· Their arguments may
be briefly summarized as follows:
The rules of evidence are designed to enable courts to
reach the truth and, in criminal cases, to secure a fair trial

)

are excluded, not because they may lack evidential trustworthiness (" a
coerced confession is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even
though statements in it may be independently established as true."
Watts v. Indiana, supra, 338 U.S. 49, 50; see also Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 190 [72 S.Ot. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872]), but because of the
manner in which they arc ohtained. (See McCormick. Developments in
Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex.L.Rev. 239, 245.) Lawlessness
of state officials in obtaining evidence is common to both coerced confessions and unreasonable searches and seizures. Illegality, alone, of the
means of getting confessions ('an not be the reason the Due Proeess
Clause eompels their exclusion, for consistency would demand exelusion
of evidence obtained by unreasoll:lule searches and seizures. The differenee in treatment of these two problems may arise from the fact that
ordinarily eoerced confessions are associated with physical coercion
against the defendant's person. This element is usually not present in
cases of unreasonable searches and seizures, (bnt see Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ot. 205, 96 L.Ed 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]) which
may involve only minor intrusions of privacy or result from good·
faith mistakes of judgment on the part of police officers. There is no
reason, of course, why, if the exclusionary rule is adopted, appropriate
exceptions could not be developed to govern these latter situations. On
the other hand, deliberate, flagrant violations of the constitutional guar·
antees like those in the present case and in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561], may be as dangerous to ordered lib·
erty as the coercion of confessions. (See Allen, Due Process and Stat~
Criminal Procedures, 48 Nw.L.Rev. 16, 26·27.)
"See 8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.l ~ 2184; Waite, Police Regula.tions by Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich.L.Rev. 679; Ramo, Evidence Obtained by III e.r; a I Search and Sei::ure, 10 m.L.Rev. 303; Grant, Circumventing the It'ollrtll A mend !Ilent, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 359; Grant,
Illegally Seized Eviilence, 15 So.CaI.L.Rev. 60; Grant, Search and
Seizure in California, Hi So.CaI.L.Rev. 139; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Corn.L.Q. 337; Judge Cardozo's opinion in
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 r1;)0 N.E. 585. 44 A.LA 510}. ia perhaps
Ule beat jadicial defense of this position.
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to those accused of crime. Evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure is ordinarily just as true and reliable as
evidence lawfully obtained. The court needs a11 reliable evidence material to the issue before it, the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and how such evidence is obtained is immaterial to that issue. It should not be excluded unless strong
considerations of public policy demand it. There are no such
considerations.
Exclusion of the evidence cannot be justified as affording
protection or recompense to the defendant or punishment to
the officers for the illegal search and seizure. It does not
protect the defendant from the search and seizure, since that
illegal act has already occurred. If he is innocent or if there
is ample evidence to convict him without the illegally obtained
evidence, exclusion of the evidence gives him no remedy at
all. Thus the only defendants who benefit by the exclusionary
rule are those criminals who could not be convicted without
the illegally obtained evidence. Allowing such criminals to
escape punishment is not appropriate recompense for the invasion of their co)'stitutional rights; it does not punish the
officers who violated the constitutional provisions; and it fails
to protect society from known criminals who should not be
left at large. For his crime the defendant should be punished.
For his violation of the constitutional provisions the offending
officer should be punished. As the exclusionary rule operates,
however, the defendant's crime and the officer's flouting of
constitutional guarantees both go unpunished. "The criminal
is to go free because the constable has blundered" (Cardozo,
J., in People v. Defore, supra, 242 N.Y. 13, 21), and "Society
is deprived of its remedy against one lawbreaker, because
he has been pursued by another." (Jackson, J., in Irvine
v. Oalifornia, supra, 347 U.S. 128, at 136; see also 8 Wigmore
on Evidence [3d ed.] § 2184, p. 40.)
Opponents of the exclusionary rule also point out that it
is inconsistent with the rule allowing private litigants to
use illegally obtained evidence (see Munson v. Munson, 27
Ca1.2d 659, 664 [166 P.2d 268] ; Oil Workers Intl. Union v.
SupM"ior Court, 103 Ca1.App.2d 512, 579-580 [230 P.2d 71] ;
cf., Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Ca1.2d 399, 412 [49 P.2d 832]),
and that as applied in the federal courts, it is capricious in
its operation, either going too far or not far enough. "[ S] 0
many exceptions to [the exclusionary] rule have been granted
the judicial blessing as largely to destroy any value it might
otherwise have had. Instead of adding to the aeeurity of
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legitimate individual rights, its principal contribution has
been to add further technicalities to the law of criminal
procedure. A district attorney who is willing to pay the price
may easily circumvent its limitations. And the price to be
paid is by no means high. " (Grant, Circumventing the Fourth
Amendment, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 359.) Thus, the rule as applied
in the federal courts has been held to protect only defendants
whose own rights have been invaded by federal officers. If
the illegal search and seizure havt> been conducted by a state
officer or a private person not acting in cooperation with
federal officers, or if the property seized is not defendant's
the rule does not apply. (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465 [41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048, 1:-1 A.L.R. 1159] ; Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 r69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed.
1819] ; Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629; Kelley v. United
States, 61 F.2d 843; Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268;
Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615; United States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900; cf. Gambino v. United States, 274 U.S. 310
[48 8.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293, 52 A.L.R. 1381].)·
Finally it has been pointed out that there is no convincing
evidence that the exclusionary rule actually tends to prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures (see Comment, 47 Nw.
L.Rev. 493, 497; cf. Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 Ill.L.Rev. I, 20;
42 Cal.L.Rev. 120) and that the" disciplinary or educational
effect of the court's releasing the defendant for police misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than 8 mild deterrent
·Since it was determined in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25.
that the Fourth Amendment prohibitions are applicable to state officers,
it D1ay be that evidence secured illegally by state officers is no longer
admissible in federal courts. (See Murphy, J., concurring in Lust'ig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, at p. 80 rfl98 Ct. 1372,93 L.Ed. 1819]. "In
my opinion the important consideration is the presence of an illegal
search. Whether state or federal officers did the searching is of no
consequence to the defendant and it should make no difference to us."
See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [69 S.Ot. 191,
93 L.Ed. 153]; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 [72 S.Ot. 93, 96
L.Ed. 59]; Allen, The Wolf Case. 45 m.L.Rev. 1, 24.)
A distinction with respect to evidence illegally obtained by private
individuals may be justified by the fact that the constitutional provisions only proscribe governmental action. ' 'It is one thing for the
government to take advantage of information which one wrongdoer reveals of another, or the revelations which ensue when thieves fall out,
and quite another thing for the government to condone or t>/lcourage a
violation of the law by officers sworD to observe and enforce the law.
If peace officers are rewarded for breaching the peace, what more
potent influence could induce people generally to hold the law in contempt and to break through lega] barriers whirh stand across the path
ot their desires I JJ (State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 377 r2;39 S.W. 100.
3! A.L.B. 383]; see also Allen, The Woll Case, 45 Ill.L.Rev. 1. 23.)
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at best." (Jackson, J., in b'vme v. Oalifornia, 347 U.S. 128,
at pp. 136-137 [78 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561].)
[7] Despite the persuasive force of the foregoing arguments, we have concluded, as Justice Carter and Justice
Schauer have consistently maintained,· that evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inadmissible. People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517];
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383],
and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled. t We
have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other
remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the
constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with
the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have
been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
When, as in the present case, the very purpose of an
illegal search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at
a trial, the success of the lawless venture depends entirely
on the court's lending its aid by allowing the evidence to
be introduced. It is no answer to say that a distinction
should be drawn between the government acting as law enforcer and the gatherer of evidence and the government
acting as judge. "[N] 0 distinction can be taken between the
Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If
the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have
a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge
to allow such iniquities to succeed." (Holmes, J., dissenting
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 [48 8. Ct. 564,
72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376].) Out of regard for its own
dignity as an agency of justice and custodian of liberty the
court should not have a hand in such "dirty business." (See
MacNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 [63 8. Ct. 608,
87 L.Ed. 819].) Courts refuse their aid in civil cases to
·See dissenting opinions in People v. Gonzales, 20 CaUd 165 [124 P.2d
44]: People v. KeTley, 22 Ca1.2d 169 [137 P.2d 11; People v. Hockin,
101 Cal.App.2d 140, 143, 149 [225 P.2d I, 913]; reversed by United
States Supreme Court, Rockin v. Oalifornia, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205,
96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]); 1ft re Dixon, 41 CaUd 756, 764
[264 P.2d 513].
fll [S]inee experience is of all teaehers the most dependable, and
Binee experience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of
evidence at one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth
should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that
experience bas clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old
rule." (Sutherland, J., in Funk v. United Statu. 290 U.s. 371,381 [54
8..Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed 369, 93 A.L.R. 1136].)
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prevent the consummation of illegal schemeR of private litigants (Lee On v. Long, 37 Ca1.2d 499, 502-503 [234 P.2d 9],
and cases cited) ; a fortiori, they should not extend that aid
and thereby permit the consummation of illegal schemes of
the state itself. (See Roberts, J., concurring in Sorells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 [53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413,
86 A.L.R. 249].) It is morally incongruous for the state to
flout constitutional rights and at the same time demand that
its citizens observe the law. The end that the state seeks
may be a laudable one, but it no more justifies unlawful acts
than a laudable end justifies unlawful action by any member
of the public. Moreover, any process of law that sanctions
the imposition of penalties upon an individual through the
use of the fruits of official lawlessness tends to the destruction
of the whole system of restraints on the exercise of the public
force that are inherent in the "concept of ordered liberty."
(See Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 Ill.L.Rev. 1, 20.) "Decency,
security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence
of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law,
it invites everyman to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely
sct its face." (Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66
A.L.R. 376] ; see also State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 377 [259
S.W. 100, 32 A.L.R. 383] ; Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43 [94
So. 329, 332] ; Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152 [224
S.\V. 860, 866, 13 A.L.R. 1303] ; State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho
43 [254 P. 788, 792] ; State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619 [234 N.W.
610,613].)
If the unconstitutional conduct of the law enforcement
officers were more flagrant or more closely connected with
the conduct of the trial, it is clear that the foregoing principles
would compel the rcversal of any conviction based thereon.
Thus, no matter how guilty a defendant might be or how
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outrageous his crime, he must not be deprived of a fair trial,
and any action, official or otherwise, that would have that
effect would not be tolerated. Similarly, he may not be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained by the use of the
rack or the screw or other brutal means no matter how
reliable the evidence obtained may be. (Roe-kin v. California,
supra, 342 U.S. 165.) Today one of the foremost public
concerns is the police state, and recent history has demonstrated all too clearly how short the step is from lawless
although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out
of human rights. This peril has been recognized and dealt
with when its challenge has been obvious; it cannot be forgotten when it strikes further from the courtroom by invading
the privacy of homes.
If the unconstitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures are to have significance they must be
enforced, and if courts are to discharge their duty to support
the state and federal Constitutions they must be willing to aid
in their enforcement If those guarantees were being effectively enforced by other means than excluding evidence obtained by their violation, a different problem would be presented. If such were the case there would be more force to
the argument that a particular criminal should not be redressed for a past violation of his rights by excluding the
evidence against him. Experience has demonstrated, however, that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies
are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures. The
innocent suffer with the gulity, and we cannot close our eyes
to the effect the rule we adopt will have on the rights of those
not before the court. "Alternatives [to the exclusionary rule]
are deceptive. Their very -statement conveys the impression
that one possibility is as effective as the next. For there is but
one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction
at all." (Murphy, J., dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, supra,
338 U.S. 25, 41; see also /Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 393 [34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834J.)
"The difficulty with [other remedies] is in part due to the
failure of interested parties to inform of the offense. No
matter what an illegal raid turns up, police are unlikely to
inform on themselves or each other.. If it turns up nothing
incriminating, the innocent victim usually does not care to
take steps which will air the fact that he has been under suspicion." (Jackson, J., in Irvine v. California, supra, 347 U.S.
l28, 137.) Moreover, even when it becomes "enerali1 iwown
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that the pollee conduct illegal searches and seizures, publie
opinion is not aroused as it is in the case of other violations of
constitutional rights. Illegal searches and seizures lack the
obvious brutality of coerced confessions and the third degree
and do not so clearly strike at the very basis of our civil liberties as do unfair trials or the lynching of even an admitted
murderer. "Freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, easily
summon powerful support against encroachment. The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is normally
invoked by those accused of crime, and criminals have few
friends." (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United
Btates, 331 U.S. 145, 156 [67 8. Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399].)
There is thus all the more necessity for courts to be vigilant in
protecting these constitutional rights if they are to be protected at all. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24
A.L.R. 1383], was decided over thirty years ago. Since then
case after case has appeared in our appellate reports describing
unlawful searches and seizures against the defendant on trial,
and those CWiles undoubtedly reflect only a small fraction of
the violations of the constitutional provisions that have actually occurred. On the other hand, reported cases involving
civil actions against police officers are rare, and those involving successful criminal prosecutions against officers are nonexistent. In short, the constitutional provisions are not being
enforced.
Granted that the adoption of the exclusionary rule will not
prevent all illegal searches and seizures, it will discourage
them. Police officers and prosecuting officials are primarily
interested in convicting criminals. Given the exclusionary
rule and a choice between securing evidence by legal rather
than illegal means, officers will be impelled to obey the law
themselves since not to do so will jeopardize their objectives.
Moreover, the same considerations that justify the privilege
against self-incrimination are not irrelevant here. As Wigmore pointed out, that privilege, just as the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, is primarily for the protection of the innocent. "The real objection is that any
system of administratio-n. which permits the prosecutio-n to
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure tU a ,ouree of
proof must itself morally suffer thereb-y. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied
with an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The
exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness
of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peacef\ll
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process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying
and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an
answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected answer,-that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate
use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are
jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems
to have been the course of experience in those legal systems
where the privilege was not recognized." (8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] § 2251, p. 309.) [8] Similarly, a system that
permits the prosecution to trust habitually to the use of illegally obtained evidence cannot help but encourage violations
of the Constitution at the expense of lawful means of enforcing
the law. (See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United
States, s'upra, 331 U.S. 145, 172.) On the other hand, if courts
respect the constitutional provisions by refusing to sanction
their violation, they will not only command the respect of lawabiding citizens for themselves adhering to the law, they will
also arouse public opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforcement of the law by bringing just criticism to bear on law enforcement officers who allow criminals to escape by pursuing
them in lawless ways.
It is contended, however, that the police do not always
have a choice of securing evidence by legal means and that
in many cases the criminal will escape if illegally obtained
evidence cannot be used against him. This contention is not
properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the constitutional provisions themselves. It was rejected when those
provisions were adopted. In such cases had the Constitution
been obeyed, the criminal could in no event be convicted.
He does not go free because the constable blundered, but
because the Constitutions prohibit securing the evidence
against him. Their very provisions contemplate that it is
preferable that some criminals go free than that the right
of privacy of all the people be set at naught. "It is vital,
no doubt, that criminals should be detected, and that all
relevant evidence should be secured and used. On the other
hand, it cannot be said too often that what is involved far
transcends the fate of some sordid offender. Nothing less is
involved than that which makes for an atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and repression for society
as a whole." (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United
States, supra, 331 U.S. 145, 173.) The situation presented
differs only in degree from otlier situations where the choice
must be made between securing convictions by illegal means
46 Clel II
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or allowing criminals to go free. Cases undoubtedly arise
where a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination,
a coerced confession, the testimony of defendant's spouse, a
violation of the attorney-client privilege or other privileges
is essential to the conviction of the criminal, but the choice has
been made that he go unpunished. Arguments against the
wisdom of these rights and privileges, just as arguments
against the wisdom of the prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures, should be addressed to the question
whether they should exist at all, but arguments against the
wisdom of the constitutional provisions may not be invoked to
justify a failure to enforce them while they remain the law
of the land.·
Weare not unmindful of the contention that the federal
exclusionary rule has been arbitrary in its application and
has introduced needless confusion into the law of criminal
procedure. The validity of this contention need not be considered now. Even if it is assumed that it is meritorious, it
does not follow that the exclusionary rule should be rejected.
[9] In developing a rule of evidence applicable in the state
courts, this court is not bound by the decisions that have
applied the federal rule, and if it appears that those decisions
have developed needless refinements and distinctions, thi~
court need not follow them. Similarly, if the federal cases
indicate needless limitations on the right to conduct reason." Finally, I have no fear that the exclusionary rule will handicap
the detection or prosecution of crime. All the arguments that have been
made on that score seem to me properly directed not against the ex·
clusionary rule but against the substantive guarantee itself. The exclusion of the evidence is the only sanction which makes the rule effective.
It is the rule, not the sanction, which imposes limits on the operation of
the police. It the rule is obeyed as it should be, and as we declare
it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evidence to be excluded
by the operation of the sanction.
"It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on
the ground that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge
to the fundamental rules to which the police are required to conform.
If those rules, defining the scope of the search which may be made
without a warrant and the scope of a search under a warrant are sound,
there is no reason why they should be violated or why a prosecuting attorney should seek to avail himself of the fruits of their violation. U
those fundamental rules are open to challenge .... the burden is on
those who challenge them to specify the modifications they deem to be
desirable. I think that is a far better course than to object to the
inclusion in this amendment of the one sanction which will give the
constitutional provision, however it is defined, genuine meaning." Senator Robert F. Wagner speaking before the New York Constitutional
Convention of 1938. (Record of the New York State Constitutional
ConventiOIl ~g-540, reprinted in Allen, Xli_ Wolf CGu, 46 D1 Ie BeV.
J.~.
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able searches and seizures or to secure warrants, this court is
free to reject them. Under these circumstances the adoption
of the exclusionary rule need not introduce confusion into
the law of criminal procedure. Instead it opens the door to
the development of workable rules governing searches and
seizures and the issuance of warrants that will protect both
the rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and
the interest of society in the suppression of crime.
The orders are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The guilt of the appellant is clearly demonstrated by the
record before us. (See People v. Ctikan, (Cal.App.) 274 P.2d
724.) He and his numerous codefendants unquestionably
engaged in a far-reaching conspiracy to commit innumerable
violations of the laws of the State of California. Six of his
codefendants pleaded guilty and seven others, in addition to
appellant, were convicted upon the trial. We have before us
solely the appeal of defendant Charles H. Cahan.
Upon the trial, certain evidence was admitted over the
objection that it had been illegally obtained. The learned trial
judge, following precisely the non exclusionary rule which,
until the filing of the majority opinion in this case, had been
firmly established as the law of this state, admitted the evidence over the objection. The non exclusionary rule had been
enunciated by this court in the relatively early case of People
v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517], and was reiterated
in People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383],
after the United States Supreme Court had adopted the socalled Weeks doctrine. (Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 [34 8.0t. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B 834].) More
recently, this court, in a well-reasoned opinion written by
Mr. Justice Traynor in People v. Gonzales, 20 Ca1.2d 165
[124 P.2d 44], again followed the nonexclusionary rule; and
it similarly followed that rule in the later decisions of People
v. Kelley, 22 Ca1.2d 169 [137 P.2d 1], and People v. Haeussler,
41 Ca1.2d 252 [260 P .2d 8]. Consistent adherence to the nonexclusionary rule has been further demonstrated by the denial
of petitions for hearing by this court in numerous cases, only
a few of which need be cited. (People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d
894 [153 P.2d 464] ; PeopLe v. One 1941 Mercur:t/ Sedan, 74
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Cal.App.2d 199 [168 P.2d 443J ; People v. Oreck, 74 Cal.App.
2d 215 [168 P.2d 186] j People v. Tucker, 88 Cal.App.2d 333
[198 P.2d 941] ; People v. Sica, 112 Cal.App.2d 574 [247 P.2d
72]; People v. Allen, 115 Cal.App.2d 745 [252 P.2d 968].)
A reading of the above-mentioned authorities shows that
this court has previously considered practically every argument now advanced for the adoption of the so-called exclusionary rule and has consistently determined that such arguments were outweighed by those advanced in favor of the
nonexclusionary rule. In adopting and adhering to the non··
exclusionary rule, the law of the State of California has
thereby been kept in harmony with the law of the great
majority of the other statcs and of all the British commonwealths; as well as in line with the considered views of the
majority of the most eminent legal scholars. Only the federal
courts and the courts of a relatively few states have adopted
the judicially created exclusionary rule. (See appendix to
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 [69 8.Ct. 1359,93 L.Ed. 1782].)
It therefore appears that the great majority of the legal minds
which have dealt with this problem have been in accord with
the views expressed by our predecessors on this court and
with the views expressed by the majority of the present members of this court as declared in People v. Gonzales, supra,
20 CaL2d 165, and our other recent decisions. But despite
this gieat wealth of legal precedent pointing to the desirability of the continuance of the nonexclusionary rule, the
majority of this court now does a judicial turnabout and
declares that" People v. Le DOllX, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517],
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383],
and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled." This
is a forthright declaration but, with all due deference to the
views of the majority, I cannot join in it.
I agree with the majority that " . . . in the absence of
a holding by the United States Supreme Court that the due
process clause requires exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained eviuence, whatever rule we adopt, whether it excludes
or admits the evidence, will be a judicially declared rule of
eviucnce." 1.'he United Slat(·s Supreme Court has never held
that the due process clause requires such exclusion but, on
the contrary, has indicated that the federal exclusionary rule
"iB a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might
negate." (Concurring opinion of Black, J., in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 40.) California, in line with the
great weight of authodty, has always applied the nonexclu-
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sionary rule, and if there is any virtue in the doctrine of
stare decisis, this court should 110t overturn this firmly established rule in the absence of compelling reasons for such
change. The difference in point of view stems from the fact
that the majority apparently have found compelling reasons
for such change while I have not.
If the question were an open one in this state, I would still
be of the opinion that the non exclusionary rule should be
judicially declared to be the rule in California. The expression of this view does not signify that I condone any illegal
search or seizure by any enforcement officer-federal, state
or local-or by any other person. On the contrary, the constitutional and statutory rights of every citizen should be
respected and protected. The law of this state provides both
criminal sanctions (Pen. Code, § 146) and civil remedies for
the violations of such rights; and it has been declared that
the federal statutes cover violations by any person of the
federal constitutional provisions. (Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 138 [74 8.0t. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561].) Hence, the main
question presented in criminal proceedings of this nature is
whether the exclusionary rule, in the light of such relative
advantages and disadvantages which may result from its
adoption, should be preferred to the non exclusionary rule.
In determining this question we may well consider the experience under the federal rule.
Tile experience of the federal courts in attempting to apply
the exclusionary rule does not appear to commend its adoption
elsewhere. The spectacle of an obviously guilty defendant
obtaining a favorable ruling by a court upon a motion to
suppress evidence or upon an objection to evidence, and
thereby, in effect, obtaining immunity from any successful
prosecution of the charge against him, is a picture which has
been too often seen in the federal practice. In speaking of
an obviously gUilty defendant, I refer by way of example
to one from whose home has been taken large quantities of
contraband, consisting of narcotics or other commodities, the
very possession of which constitutes a serious violation of the
law. The above..:mentioned result, however, is the inevitable
consequence of the application of the federal exclusionary rule
in those cases in which it may be ultimately determined tluLt
a search or seizure has been made illegally, either because of
the absence of a search warrant or because of some technical
defect in the affidavit upon which the warrant was based.
Furthermore, under the present federal practice, the trial
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of the accused is interrupted to try the question of whether
the evidence was in fact illegally obtained. This question is
often a delicate one, and the main trial is at least delayed
while the question of whether some other person has com~
mitted a wrong in obtaining the evidence has been judicially
determined; and if the claim of the accused is sustained, the
prosecution of the case against the accused, regardless of the
fact that his guilt may appear clear, is often frustrated. The
delicacy of the question results from the fact that there is still
great uncertainty in the law as to the precise circumstances
which will render a search or seizure "unreasonable," and as
to the precise nature of the defects in the affidavit which will
render invalid a search wal'rant.
It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate all the arguments which have been advanced against the adoption of the
exclusionary rule. They have been set forth in numerous
authorities cited in the majority opinion in the present case
and in the appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25.
With commendable frankness, many of these arguments are
summarized in the majority opinion here. They were discussed
extensively in a learned opinion by Justice Cardozo in People
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 [150 N.E. 585, 44 A.L.R. 510], where
the court unanimously decided against its adoption. And
while it may be an overstatement to say, as does Dean Wigmore, that the exclusion of such evidence is based upon "misguided sentimentality" (Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol.
VIII, § 2184, p. 36), it is significant that this learned writer
should have felt impelled to make such statement. The fact
is that the courts have been put to a difficult choice, but there
is no doubt that the great majority of eourts have determined
that the cost of the adoption of the exclusionary rule is too
great when compared t~ the relatively little good that it can
accomplish.
The only new argument for the adoption of the exclusionary
rule is based upon the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has again spoken on the subject in Irvine v. Oalifornia,
supra, 347 U.S. 128. There the court was again divided, with
the dissenting justices, under the particular facts of that case,
advocating a reversal but with no unanimity as to the reasons
for such reversal. The majority nevertheless affirmed the
judgment of conviction and sustained the rule of Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. 25. While arguments in favor of any
approach to the problem there presented may be found in
the opinwD.lil of the several justices, I find nothing in the maiD

Apr. 1955]

)

)

PEOPLE 'V. CAHAN

455

(f4 C.2d 434; 282 P.2d 905)

opinion which would indicate the compulsion for, or desirability of, a change in the established rule in the state. On
the contrary, I find statements in the main opinion which give
cogent reasons for adhering to the nonexclusionary rule.
In the Irvine case, the main opinion states at page 134:
"The chief burden of administering criminal justice rests
upon state courts. To impose upon them the hazard of federal
reversal for non-compliance with standards as to which this
Court and its members have been so inconstant and inconsistent would not be justified. We adhere to Wolf as stating
the law of search-and-seizure cases and decline to introduce
vague and subjective distinctions."
Again on pages 136 and 137, it is said in the main Irvine
opinion: "It must be remembered that petitioner is not invoking the Constitution to prevent 01' punish a violation of his
federal right recognized in Wolf or to recover reparations for
the violation. He is invoking it only to set aside his own
conviction of crime. That the rule of exclusion and reversal
results in the escape of guilty persons is more capable of
demonstration than that it deters invasions of right by the
police. The case is made, so far as the police are concerned,
when they announce that they have arrested their man. Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing
defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another. It protects
one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but
does n~hing to protect innocent persons who are the victims
of illegal but fruitless searches. The disciplinary or educational effect of the court's releasing the defendant for police
misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than a mild deterrent at best. Some discretion is still left to the states in criminal cases, for which they are largely responsible, and we think
it is for tht!m to determine which rule best serves them."
The above-quoted language from the main opinion in the
Irvine case shows that there is relatively little to be said in
favor of the exclusionary rule. If that rule is "no more than
a mild deterrent at best" and if'" It deprives society of its
remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued
by another," it seems clear that little good and much harm
can come from its adoption. The above-quoted language also
shows that this court is under no compulsion to reverse its
former holdings and to adopt the federal exclusionary rule.
Furthermore, I cannot ascertain from the majority opinion
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in the present case the nature of the rule which is being
adopted to supplant the well established nonexclusionary rule
in California. Is it the exclusionary rule as interpreted in
the federal courts with all its technical distinctions, exceptions, and qualifications and embracing "standards to which
[the United States Supreme] Court and its members have been
so inconstant and inconsistent." (Irvine v. Oalifornia, supra,
347 U.S. 128, 134.) Apparently not, for the majority opinion
here assumes the validity of the contention that "the federal
exclusionary rule has been arbitrary in its application and
has introduced needless confusion into the law of criminal procedure. " But after making passing reference to possible
"needless refinements and distinctions" and "needless limitations" found in the federal cases, the majority declares that
this court is free to reject the rules established by such cases,
and it concludes as follows: " Under these circumstances, the
adoption of the exclusionary rule need not introduce confusion into the law of criminal procedure. Instead it opens the
door to the development of workable rules governing searches
and seizures and the issuance of warrants that will protect
both the rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions
and the interest of society in the suppression of crime."
The majority does not suggest what these "workable rules"
may be nor how "confusion" may be avoided. Neither the
federal courts nor the courts of any of the few states which
adopted the exclusionary rule have apparently found a satisfactory solution to this problem of developing "workable
rules, " and it seems impossible to contemplate the possibility
that this court can develop a satisfactory solution. At best,
this court would have to work out such rules in piecemeal
fashion as each case might come before it. In the meantime,
what rules are to guide our trial courts in the handling of
their problems f If the nonexclusionary rule can be said to
have one unquestioned advantage, it is the advantage of
certainty. On the other hand, it appears that the exclusionary
rule, in the many ramifications of its application to innumerable factual situations, is fraught with such difficulty as to
make the formation of satisfactory, certain and workable rules
a practical impossibility.
Much of the above discussion has been directed to the undesirability of adopting the exclusionary rule if the question
were a novel one in this state. Of course, the question is not a
novel one, for the numerous decisions show that this state had
heretofore adopted a fixed and consistent policy on the &ubject.
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I find nothing that has occurred since the recent decisions of
this court in People v. Gonzales, supra, 20 Ca1.2d 165, People
v. Kelley, supra, 22 Ca1.2d 169, and People v. Haeussler,
supra, 41 Ca1.2d. 252, to furnish compelling reasons for this
court to enunciate a change of that policy.
If, however, reasons may be said to exist for a change in the
established policy of this state, I believe that the Legislature,
rather than the courts, should make such change. This is
particularly true in a situation such as the present one, when
the change of policy should be accompanied by "workable
rules" to implement such change. Otherwise, this court, by
the sweeping repudiation of its past decisions, launches the
administration of justice upon an uncharted course which the
trial courts will find great difficulty in following. In this
connection, it is worthy of note that bills have frequently been
introduced in the Legislature to accomplish precisely that
which is accomplished by the majority opinion, to wit: the
supplanting of the nonexclusionary rule by the so-called exclusionary rule, without prescribing any" workable rules" for
the latter's application. In the recent legislative sessions of
1951 (see Senate Bill No. 1689 and Assembly Bill No. 3120)
and of 1953 (see Assembly Bills Nos. 2896 and 3126), such
bills have been introduced but none has ever been brought to
a vote in either house. Under the circumstances, it would be
far better for this court to allow the Legislature to deal with
this question of policy, for the Legislature could accompany
any desired change with needed legislation establishing the
rules to guide our courts in the application of the new
policy.
Returning to the precise situation presented by the record
before us, it may be conceded that the illegality in obtaining
the evidence was both clear and flagrant. It may be further
conceded that the crimes which defendants conspired to commit were not in the class of the more serious public offenses.
The fact remains, however, that the exclusionary rule, as
adopted by the majority, is a rule for all cases and that it deprives society of its remedy against the most desperate gangster charged with the most heinous crime merely because of
some degree of illegality in obtaining the evidence against him.
Thus, it appears that the main beneficiaries of the adoption of
the exclusionary rule will be those members of the underworld who prey upon law-abiding citizens through their criminal activities. It further appears that the adoption of the
exclusionary rule will inevitably lead to unnecessary con-
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fusion, delay and inefficiency in the administration of justice.
Such is the price that society must pay for the adoption of the
exclusionary rule, a rule of uncertain nature and doubtful
value which is "no more than a mild deterrent at best."
In my opinion, the cost of the adoption of the exclusionary
rule is manifestly too great. It would be far better for this
state to adhere to the nonexclusionary rule, and to reexamine
its laws concerning the sanctions to be placed upon illegal
searches and seizures. If the present laws are deemed inadequate to discourage illegal practices by enforcement officers,
the Legislature might well consider the imposition of civil
liability for such conduct upon the governmental unit employing the offending officer, in addition to the liability now imposed upon the officer himself. It might also consider fixing a
minimum amount to be recovered as damages in the same manner that a minimum has been fixed for the invasion of other
civil rights. (Civ. Code, § 52.) These methods would be far
more effective in discouraging illegal activities on the part of
enforcement officers and such methods would not be subject to
the objection, inherent in the adoption of the exclusionary
rule, that "It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another." (Irvine v.
California, supra, 347 U.S. 128, 136.)
In my opinion, we should adhere to our prior decisions and
affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 25,
1955. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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